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This paper presents a simple model of auction equilibrium.  The
distinctive feature of the model is that each bidder may discover the
value that the item represents for herself, provided she spends  some
amount in order to be well informed.   For each agent, the decision of
whether or not to acquire information depends on a private cost of
information acquisition and on her conjectures regarding the behavior
of other bidders.  A rational expectations equilibrium is characterized.
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This paper presents a simple model of auction equilibrium.  The distinctive
feature of the model is that agents can purchase information regarding their
valuations of the object for which they are bidding.  More specifically, although the
value of the object is unknown to the bidders, each bidder might discover her
private value,  provided she spends some private amount in order to be well
informed.  
For each agent, the decision of whether or not to acquire information depends
on the cost of information acquisition and on his or her conjectures regarding the
behavior of other bidders.  Then, a rational expectations equilibrium --defined as a
situation when those conjectures are fulfilled-- is characterized.
The idea of costly information acquisition within an auction seems to be very
natural.  For example, consider the process of soliciting bids to perform some task,
such as constructing a house or building a new military jet.  The bidders know their
costs imperfectly although with some effort can narrow their uncertainty.  How
much the bidders expend in narrowing uncertainty depends on the expected benefit
from being well informed.  This in turn is coupled to the strategy for forming a bid. 
The higher the bid, the higher the likelihood of a positive surplus but the lower the
likelihood of winning. 
In spite of its relevance, however, the issue of endogeneous information
acquisition has been scarcely analyzed. The main reason for this is that models with3
costly information acquisition tend to become readily intractable.  Hence, few
specific results have been derived. 
An important merit of the present paper is that it introduces endogenous
information acquisition in a tractable way.  That is, the structure of our model is
about as simple as possible, while still capturing many important aspects of the
problem.  This tractability allows us to answer interesting questions that have not
been directly approached before.  In that sense, this paper distinguishes itself from
all previous models of which we are aware.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we review the literature related to our topic, before describing
our model and presenting our results.  Our review will only cover those models with
costly information acquisition as an endogenous element of the bidding process.
There are  only a few papers satisfying this condition since most of auction theory
focuses on models in which bidders have some exogenous level of information.1     
One of the earliest papers explicitly combining information acquisition with
bidding strategy is by Schweizer and Ungern-Sternberg (1983).  Their model
presents a common-value auction in which each bidder draws an estimate of the
value from an interval centered on the true value.  The length of the interval
around the true value can be narrowed, but only at some cost.  Since the authors
                                                          
1 For further discussion of this point and reviews of the auction literature in general, see Wilson (1992),
Milgrom (1985), McAfee and McMillan (1987), and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980).4
are unable to compute a closed form solution for the model, the analysis resorts to
simulations for the case of two bidders.  The paper represents an interesting
example of the role of information, but no definitive conclusions are derived. 
Another model with costly information acquisition is incidentally examined
in the well-known paper by Milgrom (1981). This paper studies an auction in which
k identical items are offered for sale.  Sealed bids are tendered, and the k highest
bidders each receive one object.  In an example, the author briefly discusses a two-
stage model whereby in the first stage, a bidder can decide, at a cost, to become
perfectly informed about the common value of an object being auctioned.
Lee (1984), in turn, develops a two-agent model with incomplete information
in the sense that bidders do not know with certainty whether their opponents are
informed.  The item being auctioned can take only two values, say Vh and Vl, with
probabilities p and 1- p, respectively.  The true value of the item can be completely
revealed at some cost. Lee characterizes a symmetric equilibrium in which each
bidder buys information with a positive probability and, if so, then uses a
randomized bid strategy whose distribution depends on the value he discovers. In
Lee (1985), the model is extended to the case with larger number of bidders. 
Matthews (1984) provides a broad treatment of information acquisition.  In
his model, each bidder shares a common, but unknown, value.  Further, each bidder
can buy a signal correlated with the true value.  The author discusses a symmetric
equilibrium.  An unpleasant feature of the model is that it turns out to be
cumbersome:  even in a simple example, Matthews is unable to give a precise5
description of the equilibrium bidding function.  Furthermore, since all bidders have
identical information costs, all of them end with the same level of information.
Intuitively, it would seem more likely that bidders are heterogeneous; with different
bidders having different information levels.  Thus, we feel that Matthews’ model
ignores an important and realistic issue.  Hausch and Li (1993) develop a common-
value model closer in spirit to Lee’s.  The good can take two values, 1 and 0, with
probabilities p and 1- p, respectively.  Any potential bidder who wishes to bid needs
to pay a fixed cost and, once in the auction, can buy a private signal giving
information about the true value.  The accuracy of the signal is positively related to
the amount spent on it.  The authors characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which
bidders enter the auction with a fixed probability q and, if so, they bid according to
a randomized bid strategy which depends on the signal they have received.  The
analysis is extended to the private-value case in Hausch and Li (1993a).
  In the present paper, we allow a continuum of feasible values (rather than a
finite number, as in Lee’s and Hausch and Li’s models), and we endow each bidder
with a private cost (rather than a common cost, as in Matthews’ model). Under
those circumstances, to examine symmetric equilibria seems to be unnatural.  We
prefer, instead, to characterize an asymmetric equilibrium in which different
bidders will endogenously find it convenient to acquire different information levels.6
III.  THE MODEL
A.  The Environment
Consider a large number of risk neutral bidders, i = 1, 2,...,N, who are trying
to buy an object in a first-price sealed-bid auction.2  Let us assume that the object
has some particular value, Vi, for each particular bidder, i, but the value Vi is
unknown, even to the agent i himself.   In fact, the valuations of the object are
random variables with identical density functions:
             Vi ~ f(.)       i = 1, 2,..., N                   (1)
where f is a continuous density function with support in the interval [Vl, Vu] and
with expected value _ V.
An agent can follow one of two alternate strategies.  First, he might spend an
amount ci in order to discover the true value that the object represents for himself. 
Then, based on his findings, he might form an optimal bid so that his expected
profit is maximized conditioned to the new information he has received.  On the
other hand, this agent might decide to save ci and just use the expectation of Vi as
an estimate of his (unknown) true valuation.  In this case, he would form an
optimal bid conditioned to his beliefs and prior information.
The costs of information are also random variables with a common
distribution.  Each agent knows his particular cost but is unaware of the costs of
other bidders.  Specifically,
                                                          
2  In a first-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder submits his bid in a private way, without observing the
bids offered by his competitors.  The auction is won by the bidder who presents the highest bid.7
            ci ~  g(.)       i = 1, 2,..., N                   (2)
where g is a continuous density function in the interval [Cl, Cu].  This distribution is
also common knowledge.
In these circumstances, an agent should evaluate all the probable outcomes
he could face in case he decides to be informed.  Those outcomes depend, of course,
on the behavior of his competitors and, in particular, on the information that other
bidders have with respect to their valuations of the object.
A conventional way of determining the bid for each agent is to compute the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.  Each player shares knowledge of a common
distribution on (c,V) and knows her own c.  Should the agent buy information, she
will also know her own V.  In any case, she will only have a distribution on the costs
and values for the other bidders.  Unfortunately, computing a Bayesian Nash
equilibirum is extremely difficult, particularly with a continuum of possible costs
and values and more than two bidders.  Motivated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
we take a somewhat more tractable view of each agent’s perception of the actions of
other agents.
We start with each bidder assuming that a proportion p of bidders chooses
not to be informed about their valuations and consequently are just using the
common expectation, _ V, as a bid.3  Therefore, if a bidder pays ci and then he
                                                          
3  Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to assume that all uninformed bidders are offering _ V.  All the
results of the model would go through provided at least two uninformed bidders are offering _ V.  This latter
assumption, in turn, seems to be reasonable because:  (a) if only one bidder is offering _ V, he would find it
convenient to offer slightly less than that; and (b) if none bidder is offering _ V, some bidders would have an
incentive to increase their bids.  The assumption in the text is convenient, but not strictly necessary.8
discovers that his valuation is Vi, his optimal bidding strategy would have the form
bi = B(p, Vi), and his expected gross profit -- given that particular valuation -- would
be p = p(p, Vi).  Since ex ante Vi is a random variable, p(p, Vi) is also random, and
the value of the information is given by its expected value. Define the expected
profit as P(p) = E(p(p,V)), where the expectation is over V and is based on the
density function f.  This is the expected profit before information is acquired.
  On the other hand, if the agent refuses to buy information, he will find it
optimal to bid just _ V, given his conjectures that pN -1 > 0 other bidders are
behaving in identical way.  If he offers less than _ V, that could not increase his
expected profit, because the probability of winning the auction would be zero
anyway; if he offers more than _ V, he would increase his chances of "winning" the
auction, but in unfavorable conditions.4  In short, he will offer _ V, and his expected
profit would be zero.5
Obviously, the decision of whether or not to acquire information depends
simply  on the relation between the value of the information --i.e., the positive
                                                          
4  Note that a symmetric equilibrium where all uninformed bidders offer less than _ V is not possible. 
Suppose, to the contrary, that all uninformed bidders offer _ V - d, where _ V ³ d > 0.  In that case, any single
bidder would find it profitable to offer _ V-(d/2) since then he will have a positive expected profit, provided
all  other  bidders maintain their  previous strategies.   Therefore, the original set of strategies could not
be an equilibrium. This is the same argument that in a Bertrand equilibrium, price will equal marginal
cost.
5  We will always assume that p is bounded away from the extreme cases 0 and 1.  If the bidder
conjectures that he is the only uninformed bidder, it is not certain anymore that someone else has a
valuation _ V.  Then, the bidder might find it optimal to offer less than _ V. A common-value, two-bidder
auction in which only one is uninformed has been analyzed in Milgrom and Weber (1982b) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1981). Those papers derive a mixed-strategy equilibrium and show that the
expected profit of the uninformed bidder is zero.     9
amount of expected gross profit that information provides-- and the cost of
information acquisition.  For a particular p, the relation between P(p) and ci only
depends on ci: if ci is too high, the agent i will refuse to be informed.  A Rational
Expectations Equilibrium is given by a value pe such that the actual proportion of
bidders for which  P(pe) < ci is (nearly) equal to pe itself.6
B.  The Equilibrium
Let us first consider the economic problem of a bidder, say i, in case he
decides to buy information and then discovers a value Vi.  This agent conjectures
that n < N other bidders are refusing to pay for information and are bidding just the
expected value of V, while other [(N-n)-1] bidders have already discovered their
respective valuations.  If Vi is less than _ V, this agent perceives that his probability
of winning the auction is zero, because n other agents will be offering _ V.  If V i is
greater than _ V we shall proceed by assuming that the optimal bid has the form bi =
B(p,Vi); i.e., it is a function of the observed Vi and conjectured p, where B is a
continuous, strictly increasing function in Vi, which in equilibrium should be
common to all agents.7  Therefore, the maximum expected profit of the bidder is
                                                          
6  While a Bayesian Nash equilibrium might be more common in the literature on games of
incomplete information, computational complexity is a real issue in analyzing auctions and bidding
problems, particularly when there are multiple agents and information acquisition.  The Rational
Expectations equilibrium adopted here is more tractable; furthermore, it is commonly used in other
contexts, such as Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) model of information acquisition  in asset markets
with uncertain returns.
7  The assumption that B is common to all agents follows from the symmetry of the situations faced by all
  bidders.  The differences in information costs are relevant to determine whether or not to acquire10
given by the expression:
where p (the proportion of uninformed bidders) is defined as (n/N), B-1 is the inverse
of B with respect to V and, of course, (1-p)N-1 ³ 0.  
In the right-hand side of expression (3), the second factor represents the
probability of winning the auction, i.e., the probability that each of the other [(1-
p)N-1] bidders who are getting information discovers a valuation smaller than Vi. 
To derive the function B, we use the envelope theorem which ensures that
dp/dVi =  ¶p/¶Vi.  Therefore:
But, since bi = B(Vi), we end with:
Now, this differential equation can be solved by simple integration, and by
imposing the boundary condition that limV ® E(V) p(p,V) = 0.  Hence, we obtain:
                                                                                                                                                                                          
information, but are totally irrelevant at the moment of forming an optimal bid after being informed. Once
the bidder has acquired information, bygones are bygones, and the observed value, Vi, is all that matters.
p(p, V ) =  (V -b  ) [F( B ( b  ))]           (3) ii i
[(1 - p)N - 1] -1
i
d (p, V )
dV
 = [ F (B (b))]              (4)
i
i
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i
p
d (p, V )
dV
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i
i
[(1 - p)N - 1] p11
where p(p,Vi) is a function of the random variable Vi.
Finally, substituting (6)  into (3), and solving for bi, we can get the following
expression for the optimal bid:
It is trivial to check that ¶B(p,Vi)/¶Vi > 0, so that the original assumption is
satisfied.  Standard arguments (see Wilson (1977)) ensure that equation (7) is the
unique symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy, among the class of differentiable,
strictly increasing functions on [_ V, Vu].  Note that, given the presence of uninformed
bids, the auction can be thought as a conventional auction with _ V as the reservation
price of the seller.  With this interpretation, the equivalence between first-price and
second price auctions holds, and B(p, Vi) can be thought as the expectation of the
second highest valuation among a fictitious seller and the informed bidders,
conditioning on Vi being the highest valuation. 
The value of the information is given by the expectation of p(p, Vi) over the
relevant interval [_ V, Vu].  Then,
p(p, V ) =    (F( ))  d                 (6) i V
Vsubi [(1 - p)N - 1] ò Q Q
B(p, V ) =  V  - 
 F( )  d
F(V )
                  (7) ii
V
V [(1 - p)N - 1]
[(1-p)N - 1]
i
i ò Q Q
P Q QF F
F (p)  =        (F( ))  d    f( ) d           (8) V
V
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where P(p) is the (ex ante) expected gross profit of a bidder, should he decide to buy
information, conditioned on his beliefs that the other [(1-p)N-1] bidders are also
becoming informed about their respective valuations.  Those beliefs about the
behavior of the competitors are summarized in p.  Note that dP/dp > 0 for all
relevant p. 
Consequently, we obtain the decision rule:
       Buy information if P(p) ³ ci
                                               (9)
      Do not buy information otherwise
Finally, we impose the equilibrium condition that the expectations of the
bidders are rational.   Hence, the value of p conjectured by all bidders when taking
their decisions should be consistent with the true p8.  Let G be the distribution
function of information costs, and define
                     W(x) º 1 - G (x)                        (10)
Thus,  W(x) is the proportion of bidders with information costs greater than x. 
Obviously, dW/dx £ 0.
Since p can only take discrete values, a rational expectations equilibrium, pe,
will be defined by the condition:
                                                          
8  This idea depends on a somehow heuristic application of the Law of Large Numbers.  Strictly speaking,
this law would only apply if the number of bidders goes to infinity, so our reasoning should be seen as an
approximation for a large N.13
where
The last condition defines the feasible range of p consistent with the previous
discussion.  Recall that the model is not interesting for the case p = 0 (i.e., all
bidders are informed). That situation corresponds to the standard model where
everybody knows his true valuation, and this has been extensively studied in
auction literature.  On the other hand, if p = 1 (no one buys information), everybody
would use the same strategy and their expected profits would be zero.  This would
be the case, if the minimum information cost, Cl, is very high with respect to the
maximum valuation Vu. Finally, the extreme cases with only one informed or
uninformed bidder has been analyzed elsewhere by other authors.9  
The following lemma results directly from the fact that W declines as p
increases.
Lemma 1:  If W(P(1/N)) > (1/N) and W(P(1-(1/N)) < 1 - (1/N), then there exists a
unique rational expectations proportion of uninformed bidders, pe, in the range
(1/N, 1-(1/N)).
This is illustrated in Figure 1.  Three different distribution of information
                                                          
9  See footnote 1. 
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cost are shown.  In panels (a) and (c), costs are either too high or too low for an
interior pe  exists.
Finally, we derive an expression for the expectation of the winning bid. That
is,
where b represents the winning bid, gN* is the density function of the maximum in a
sample of [(1-p)N] draws on V, and GN* represents the corresponding distribution
function.  This expression will be useful later.
IV. RESULTS
A.  The Effects of "Hypotheticalness"
We begin with an extension of the model that is formally trivial, but seems to
have empirical relevance. Consider now the case when the bidders attribute some
positive probability to the event in which (ex post) the transaction is not really
consummated by the auctioneer.  Specifically, each bidder believes that, with
probability  a, the auction is only "cheap talk" and that the auctioneer is not really
willing to sell the object to the winner of the auction.
In an obvious way, the decision rule given by (9) can now be restated as:
       Buy information if (1-a)P(p) ³ ci
                                                           (9')
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The effect of uncertainty regarding the validity of the auction is just to reduce
the value of information and the incentive of each agent to be well informed. 
Consequently, it also increases the equilibrium proportion of uninformed bidders,
pe. That is, the greater the "hypotheticalness" of the auction, the greater the
proportion of bidders who decide not to buy information and the less informative the
bids will be.
For particular forms of the density functions f and g, expression (9') allows us
to compute the "critical level of hypotheticalness," defined as a value a* such that
(1-a*) P(1) » Cl or, more precisely, W[(1-a)P(1-(1/N))] > 1-(1/N) for any a ³ a*.  That
is, for any level of confidence smaller than that corresponding to (1-a*), there is no
solution to (11) in the relevant range, since no one is willing to spend sure resources
to increase the low chances of winning limited profits. Thus, the auction does not
have to be purely hypothetical for everyone to remain uninformed.  This behavior is
illustrated in Figure 2.  The figure shows how W depends on p for various a. W
moves outward with decreases in a.  For a*, no interior pe exists.
From the point of view of the seller, we can think of the efficiency of an
auction as its ability to induce revelation of the true values of the bidders. In this
sense, the more hypothetical is the auction, the less efficient it is.  For levels of
hypotheticalness above a*, the auction delivers no relevant information.  An
illustrative example of this point is given by the case of a firm going public. In a16
common procedure, the firm asks selected potential investors to state the price that
they would be willing to pay for the offering.  After their statements arrive, the firm
decides whether or not to  go ahead with the sale.  Our previous discussion suggests
that, if investors need to investigate the true value of the firm and if they think it is
highly probable that the sale will not be consummated, the pre-issue gathering of
information will be barely informative for the firm.  Most potential investors will
find it inconvenient to spend resources to learn the exact value of the firm.
B. Comparative Statics
In the following discussion, we examine the effects of the number of bidders,
and specific changes in the distributions of information costs and valuations.
1.  The Number of Bidders.  For any fixed p, a greater number of bidders implies
a smaller value of information; that is, ¶P(p,N)/¶N < 0.  This follows immediately
from the fact that, given a particular p, a greater N implies a smaller value for the
integral in brackets in expression (8), above. Therefore, an increase in the number
of bidders represents an upward shift in the graph of the function W(P(p, N)) --as
defined by expression (11)-- and, in turn, this ensures a higher equilibrium value for
p. This has been illustrated in Figure 3.
More formally, consider the equilibrium condition (11) as an implicit function
in p and N, and --just for the sake of exposition-- assume that the first inequality
holds as equality.  Then, the equilibrium condition is:17
H(p, N) = 0            (13)
where the function H is defined as10
Therefore,
which validates the previous informal argument.
Now, since the equilibrium p, pe, increases with N (provided W is not "flat"), it
follows from the expressions (13)-(14) and the monotonicity of W that the
equilibrium value of P(pe, N) should be smaller the greater the value of N.  Since
the density function f has not changed, this is only possible through an increase of
the exponent [(1-p)N-1] in expression (8). These arguments lead to the following:
Proposition 1. A greater number of bidders implies no larger proportion of bidders
buying information, but a greater number of well-informed bidders.
It is well known that, in the standard model of auction, an increase of the
                                                          
10  Here we have made explicit the presence of N as an argument of P.
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number of bidders increases the expectation of the winning bid.  In our case, the
effect of the increase of the total number of bidders on the expectation of the
winning bid can be analyzed from expression (12) above.  Heuristically, an increase
in N causes both an increase in the expression in brackets, for any given z, and a
shift of the mass of gN*(z) to the right.  Since B(p,z) is increasing in z, both effects act
in the same direction.  Then, the next proposition follows.
Proposition 2. An increase of the number of bidders implies an increase of the
expected value of the winning bid.
A formal proof of this statement is provided in the appendix.11
2.  Variations in the distribution of information costs.  For this case, it is
convenient to rewrite the equilibrium condition (13) as:
               pe =  1 - G(P(pe))                       (13') 
where G is the cumulative function corresponding to the density g.  Next, let us
begin by considering an arbitrary change in g.  Since P(pe) is not affected by the
changes in g, it follows that changes in the initial equilibrium pe depend only on
changes of G(P(p)) when evaluated at that point.  Formally,  consider two different
distribution functions, G0 and G1, with p0 and p1 as the corresponding equilibrium
proportions.  Clearly
                                                          
11  An alternate proof can be based on the fact that the number of informed bidders increases with
the total number of bidders.  Thus, in accordance with a previous remark, the situation is equivalent
to an increase of the number of bidders in a standard auction with reservation price _ V.    19
     W1(P(p0))   ³   W0(P(p0))  iff
G0(P(p0))   ³   G1(P(p0))
where the subscript {0,1} identifies the pre and post-change functions.  Therefore, p1
³ p0  iff G1(P(p0))  £   G0(P(p0)), as illustrated in Figure 4.
The intuition behind is obvious.  For any value of p, including the
equilibrium pe, the value of information is independent of G.  Thus, the original
equilibrium can only be changed with changes in the proportion of bidders with
information costs below or above the corresponding value of information.
To advance a further step, consider the case where changes in  g induce an
increase in pe and, consequently, a decrease in [(1-p)N-1].  The latter effect acts in
the same way as an exogenous decrease of N.  Hence, it causes a decrease of the
integral in the expression for the expected winning bid, E(b), above, and a
simultaneous shift of mass of the density gN* to the left. Of course, to have a strict
change of p, the change in G must be big enough to overcome the discrete nature of
p.  This  discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. The effect of a change in the distribution of information costs
depends on the change of G, evaluated at the initial equilibrium value of
information.   If  G(P(pe)) increases, then the proportion of informed bidders as well
as the expectation of the winning bid will (weakly) increase; if G(P(pe)) decreases,
then both variables will (weakly) decrease.
3.  Variations in the Distribution of Valuations.  We will continue to use the
subscripts {0, 1} to refer to pre and post-change functions, respectively.  Our20
discussion will be focused on some specific cases, and we do not presume to be
exhaustive.
Let us consider first a mean-increasing/shape-preserving shift of f; i.e., for
some s > 0,
f1(z) =  f0(z - s)       z e [Vl + s, Vu + s] (16)
It is not difficult to see that, in this case, the function P(p) does not change. 
In effect, for any arbitrary p, we have:
where the notation is self-evident.  Since W has not changed, the equilibrium value
of p remains unchanged.12  
However, the change on f increases the expectation of the winning bid by an
amount equal to s. To see this, notice that:
                                                          
12  This result is intuitively clear.  Holding p fixed, the shift on the distribution of valuations increases
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      = s + E0(b).
Thus, we are able to conclude that:
Proposition 4. A mean-increasing shape-preserving shift of the density function f
implies an increase of the expectation of the winning bid by the amount of the mean
shift, while the proportion of bidders who buy information remains unchanged. 
The implicit message here can be rephrased as follows:  all that matters is
the magnitude of information costs compared with potential gains, and not the
magnitude of information costs compared with valuations.
Finally, we would like to analyze the case of a symmetric mean preserving
spread of f that we define as a change of f such that, for some function s(x):
          f1(z) = f0(z) + s(z)          z e [Vl, Vu]         (19)
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The conditions (i)-(iv) seem to be a natural description of  many typical
situations. Of course, (i) and (ii) are self-explanatory.  In turn, (iii) and (iv)
guarantee that the new distribution gives more mass to the tails of the support
[Vl,Vu] but preserving a sort of symmetry in the shift.  Figure 5  gives an example
where those conditions hold, showing the density, f, the distribution function, F,
and the analogous functions for s.
We want to determine the effect of this change on pe.  From Figure 1 and the
arguments there, we know that pe will increase (decrease) if the shift of f produces
an upward (downward) shift of W viewed as a function of p.  In turn, for any given
pe, W will move up (down) if the changes of f induce a negative (positive) change on
P(pe). It is intuitive to think that, if the distribution of the values concentrates
around the mean, the benefit of acquiring private information should decrease;
then, the proportion of uninformed bidders should go up.  However, that conjecture
is not necessarily true. The following result states that the direction of the change
of P(pe) cannot be determined under the general conditions of a symmetric mean
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preserving shift.
Proposition 5.  Consider an equilibrium proportion of uninformed bidders, pe, and
then suppose a symmetric mean preserving spread as defined by (i)-(iv) above. The
effect of that change on pe and P(pe) is indeterminant without further restrictions.
The proof of the result is given in the appendix.  The rationale behind the
result is that, as the distribution of the values shrinks around the mean, the gain
from acquiring information is reduced by the need of even greater precision.  In
turn, the need for even greater precision comes from the fact that the competitors
already have relatively accurate information. Although the sign of the movement of
pe is undetermined under the general conditions of a symmetric mean preserving
shift, it is easily determined if, in addition to (i)-(iv), the following constraints are
imposed:
If  l > 1, the additional conditions imply that f1 is obtained just by
"compressing" the original function f0 horizontally and "dilating" it vertically in a
proper way. This is the case illustrated in Figure 6.  Of course, the opposite is true
when l < 1.  It is easy to check that f1 is a well-defined density function.
(v) f is symmetric; and
(vi)   f (V+z) =   f (V+ z),      z   [V  - 
V -  V
,  V + 
V  -  V




For concreteness, let's consider l > 1.  Thus,
Then, letting z = _ V + l(y-_ V), we get:
Now define y(X) º X[(1-p)N-1]- X[(1-p)N].  Then, as is shown in the appendix:
Finally, define  w º lx + (1-l)_ V, obtaining: 
Therefore, if l > 1, P1(pe) £ P0(pe), and it follows that the equilibrium p
should increase as the mass of the density f is concentrated around _ V. In this case,
the intuitive conjecture holds.  Therefore,
Proposition 6.  Consider a symmetric, mean preserving change of the density f, so
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  that its mass  becomes  more concentrated around the mean valuation in
accordance with (v)-(vi)above.  Then, at the new equilibrium, the incentive to
acquire information and the proportion of informed bidders decrease.
V.  GENERALIZED INFORMATION
 For completeness, we will now suggest a natural way in which the simplest
model might be extended to cover a finite number of feasible information levels,
rather than just the extreme cases of null or perfect information.  A formal
treatment of this  extension would be technically cumbersome. The following is
purely descriptive and informal.
Let us say that, as before, the object has some particular value, Vi, for each
particular bidder, i, but the values Vi are unknown.  The valuations are drawn from
the common knowledge distribution f on [Vl, Vu].
Now, assume that each agent can buy one among k different levels of
information, say I1,...,Ik, regarding her private valuation.  By acquiring Ij (1 £ j £ k),
the bidder can observe a signal s with conditional density hj(s½Vi). Let Lj(Vi) be the
set of all values that the signal can take when Vi is the true valuation of the
observer, given the information level Ij. Further, let hj, j = 1,...,k, be the
(unconditional) density function of the signals given the information level Ij. 
Allowing some loss of generality, say that, for a bidder i, the information level Ij has
a cost cij, where ci is a private parameter for each bidder. 
Following Matthews (1984), we will order the information levels saying that,
 for 1 £ j < k, Ij+1 is more informative than Ij in the sense that, for any given set of26
available actions, the supremum of the expected profit of a bidder having Ij+1 is
greater than the supremum of the expected profit of a bidder with Ij.  Since the true
valuations are not observable, the optimal bid of each bidder should only depend on
the observable signal.  Thus, we will consider that a bidder with information level Ij
uses a bidding functions with the form Bj(s), where s represents the signal she
observes. Let us assume that, for all j, the function Bj is differentiable and strictly
increasing in the relevant range È v e [Vl ,Vu] Lj(V); then, it has an inverse, say sj,
which is also strictly increasing. 
Let us consider the situation of a bidder i who is deciding whether to buy the
information level Ik.  If, after acquiring that information, she observes a signal s
and she presents a bid Bk(s), her expected profit would be:
The factor Q(Bk(s)) represents the probability of winning the auction by bidding an
amount Bk(s).  To give content to Q(Bk(s)), assume that the bidder conjectures that
proportions p1,...pk-1 are acquiring  the information levels I1,...Ik-1, respectively.
Thus, Q(Bk(s)) can be written as:
where Hj represents the distribution function corresponding to the density hj.
k v
V
subk(V) kk  =   ( V  - B(s)) Q(B (s)) h(s|v) f(v)ds dv           (24) P L òò
Q(B (s)) =  H (( B (s)) ) ...H (( B (s)) )            (25) k1 1 k
p N
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Introducing (25) into (24), differentiating with respect to Bk, setting it to 0
and, finally, using the fact that at equilibrium sk(Bk(s)) = s,  we obtain a system of
differential equation where the optimal bid depends on the competitors' strategies,
Bj (j < k), and on the assumed values p1,...pk-1.   The solution of that system of
equations, provided it exists, yields the equilibrium bidding functions for a given set
p1,...,pk-1.  Suppose that the set B1,...Bk solves that system of first order
conditions.  Then, from (24), we obtain an expression for the expected profit
associated with each information level, as a function of the conjectured  p's.    
Given a set of conjectures p1,...pk-1, a bidder with information cost c will
position herself in the informational level where the net value of information is
maximized. For a bidder with information cost c, we  define the net value of
information level Ij by the expression:
                          Pj - cj       j  = 1,...k            (26)
Clearly, if cm > cn, then the bidder with cm will necessarily choose a less
informative information level than a bidder with cost cn: otherwise, one of those
bidders would not be taking the best action.  Then, in accordance with the simplest
model, a natural definition of equilibrium is that the proportion of bidders in each
information level  Ij is (nearly) equal to pj itself.  This completes the description of
the environment.
    To establish sufficient conditions for the existence of this equilibrium, as well as
its characterization at this level of generality, is beyond our present objective. In28
this paper, we will not make further attempt in that direction.  That represents a
room for further developments.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined an extremely common situation in auctions and
bidding, yet one usually neglected  in the auction literature.  Specifically,  we
examined the case of a set of bidders formulating bids based on incomplete
information on value with the option of purchasing additional information.  This
situation applies to many bidding contexts, including competitive bidding by
suppliers with unknown and somehow different production costs. Not  only did we
solve for the closed form expressions for the bidding function and the expected
winning bid, but we also developed comparative statics results on the effects of the
number of bidders and changes in the distribution of valuations and information
costs.
In addition to its applications  within the realm of the auction literature,  we
argued that our model might be useful to evaluate the informational content of
some procedures commonly used to  assess the value that an object represents for a
group of individuals. In particular, we offered an immediate implications of costly 
information acquisition for the case of firms going public.  The idea of costly
information acquisition is clearly relevant in other contexts, as for example in
principal-agent models.  Although the principal is unable to observe the action of
the agent, he can certainly become better informed by spending resources.  The29
explicit consideration of this fact, perhaps along the lines suggested by this paper,
might provide useful insights into those problems.  Indeed, costly information
acquisition seems to be a natural companion for the costly  state verification setup
commonly used in the literature.30
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APPENDIX
A.  Proof of Proposition 2.  Let us define:
                                 N*  º (1-p)N                (A-1)
and
Clearly,
and that the expectation of the winner bid can be written simply as:
Now,
From proposition 1 in the text, we already know that the second factor is
positive.  Thus, it suffices to prove that the first is non-negative.  Differentiating (A-
3c), we can say that:
B(z, N ) =  z  -  supz {
F( )
F(z)
}  d      if z   V             (A-2)
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*33
where, for notation convenience, the subscript of the density function  gN* has been
dropped. It follows from (A-3b) that the first term in this expression is nonnegative.
 In turn, the second term can be written as:
which, by straightforward integration by part, yields:
Finally, we use the fact that, for all N*, G(v) = 0 and G(V) = 1, so that its
derivative at those points is zero.  Therefore, we end with:
 
and the result follows immediately.                        
B.  Proof of Proposition 5.  Let 0 and 1 identify the pre and post-change functions,
respectively. Also, let pe denote the equilibrium value of p before the change of the
density f. Thus, from expression (8) in the text,
dE(b)
dN
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where i = {0, 1},
and N* º [(1-pe)N-1].
Integrating  by parts and noting that F(Vu)=1 and M(_ V))=0,
Now, let us define y(X) º XN*- XN*+1, to have:
We seek to  show that the expression
can take any sign, even after imposing the conditions in (i)-(iv) of the text.  
Note that the function y(x)  has a maximum at x = N*/(N*+1) < 1, and an
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01 ( p ) -   ( p ) =    [ ( F (x)) -   ( F (x))] dx              (A-13)
u PP ò yy
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Now consider a case in which
  
            F0(x) = F1(x)               _ V £ x £ v*
                  ³ F1(x)              v* < x £ Vu
 
Since F0 ³  F1 while y is decreasing in [v*, Vu], it follows that y(F0) £ y(F1) in
that interval. Thus,
and then W0(pe) ³ W1(pe). 
In other words, we have seen that, after the change in f, the function W has a
downward jump at the original equilibrium value of p, pe.  From Figure 1, it is clear
that the new equilibrium p should be smaller than pe.
On the other hand,  consider now a case where
            F0(x) = F1(x)              _ V £ x £ v*
                  ³ F1(x)              v* < x £ Vu
A similar argument shows that, in this case, W0(pe) £ W1(pe).  Then, the new
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01 ( p ) -   ( p ) =    [ ( F (x)) -   ( F (x))] dx   0             (A-17) *
u PP ò £ yy3637
Figure 1:  Determination of the equilibrium value of p38
Figure 2:  Critical level of "Hypotheticalness"39
Figure 3:  Effect of the number of bidders on W(P(p)), N1 > N040
Figure 4:  Shifts on W(P(p)) given changes of g41
Figure 5:  Symmetric Mean-Preserving shift of fFigure 6:  Special case of Symmetric Mean-Preserving shift of f